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Swiping Through the Pages of Apple’s E-Book Saga: A Comment on Hub-And-Spoke 
Conspiracies Under the Sherman Act 
 
Travis Clark*   
 
I. Introduction 
 
With the release of the iPad in 2009, Apple entered into agreements with five of the six 
major publishing companies (“publisher defendants” or “publishers”) to sell “e-books” on the new 
device.  At the time, Amazon was the only real competitor in the e-book market.  Amazon had set 
the price of e-books at $9.99, and the publishing companies saw this pricing as a threat to their 
way of doing business.  Apple approached the publishing companies and proposed an agency 
model that resulted in the publisher defendants receiving less per e-book sold via Apple as opposed 
to Amazon.  However, this agreement allowed the publishers to regain control of pricing over 
Amazon.  The increase in e-book prices from $9.99 to $14.99 (and $19.99 for best sellers) caught 
the attention of the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”), and subsequently, the DOJ and 
thirty-three states filed suit against Apple and the publisher defendants for conspiring to raise 
prices across the e-book market.  
This Comment will analyze the resulting recent decision United States v. Apple, Inc.,1 and 
its application of the per se rule in determining whether Apple’s conduct unreasonably restrained 
trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.  Part II will discuss the history and 
development of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.  Part III will provide an overview of Apple and the 
Second Circuit’s decision.  Part IV will argue why the rule of reason is the proper standard for 
                                                     
* J.D. Candidate, 2017, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2013, Bucknell University.  Thank you to 
Professor Charles Sullivan and my fellow Law Review editors for their help and guidance throughout the writing of 
this Comment.   
1 United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2015). 
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analyzing Apple’s liability under § 1 of the Sherman Act. Part V will briefly conclude with why 
the procompetitive effects outweigh the anticompetitive effects of Apple’s conduct.  
 
II. History and Development of Section 1 
 
Under Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act (“Sherman Act”), “[e]very contract, 
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce 
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.”2  The 51st Congress 
passed the Sherman Act in 1890.  Although the goals of the Act have been hotly debated since its 
inception, its core purpose is to protect competition by prohibiting unreasonable restraints of 
trade.3  The Sherman Act was constructed broadly in order to adjust to the Nation’s economic 
conditions as they change over time: “Just as the common law adapts to modern understanding 
and greater experience, so too does the Sherman Act’s prohibition on ‘restraints of trade’ evolve 
to meet the dynamics of present economic conditions.”4  
A. Setting the Framework 
 
Violation of Section 1 requires proof of “(1) a contract, combination, or conspiracy among 
two or more separate entities that (2) unreasonably restrains trade and (3) affects interstate or 
foreign commerce.”5  A conspiracy requires either direct or circumstantial proof of a concerted 
action.6  The Supreme Court has explained that the evidence presented must prove that the parties 
“had a conscious commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve an unlawful objective.”7  
                                                     
2 15 U.S.C. § 1 (year). 
3 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION (2005). 
4 Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 899 (2007) (“Congress intended § 1 to give courts the 
ability ‘to develop governing principles of law’ in the common-law tradition.”) (internal citations omitted); see also 
Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 731 (1988) (“The changing content of the term 
‘restraint of trade’ was well recognized at the time the Sherman Act was enacted.”).  
5 Antitrust Law Developments, p. 2. 
6 See id. 
7 Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 768 (1984). 
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Significantly, this requires more than mere parallel conduct undertaken by competitors.8  
Assuming a conspiracy exists, the next issue is determining the nature or type of restraint that 
allegedly restricts competition in the relevant market.9  After the market and the nature of the 
restraint have been identified, the next issue becomes what standard of analysis applies in 
determining whether there has been an unreasonable restraint on trade—the rule of reason or the 
per se rule.10  The rule of reason is the dominant standard for analyzing whether an agreement 
restrains trade, and it requires courts to balance the restraint’s anticompetitive effects with its 
procompetitive effects.11  The per se rule is used for restraints with which courts have had enough 
experience to predict with confidence that the practice would almost always be invalidated under 
the rule of reason.12   
B. Horizontal and Vertical Price Restraints 
 
This Comment focuses on horizontal and vertical price restraints.  Horizontal price 
restraints exist between two entities at the same level of competition.13  When two manufacturers 
produce a similar product, they are competing against each other on the same level of the market.14  
If manufacturer A sells his product at $10, manufacturer B is incentivized to sell her product at 
$9.15  By lowering the cost of her good, manufacturer B attracts more consumers to purchase her 
product.16 However, in order to compete, manufacturer A may lower the price of his good to $8.17  
When the two manufacturers realize that the competition is harming their ability to turn a profit, it 
                                                     
8 See id. 
9 See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 1 (1997). 
10 Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007). 
11 Id. at 885. 
12 Id. at 886. 
13 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 2223 (2005). 
14 See id. 
15 See id. 
16 See id. 
17 See id. 
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may be in their best interest to agree on setting the price of their goods at $10 or even $11.18  This 
is an example of horizontal price fixing.19  
The Sherman Act is not concerned simply with competitors raising prices to an 
unreasonable level.20  In the hypothetical above, if manufacturers A and B decide to fix the price 
of their good at $8, their agreement still might be an unlawful restraint of trade—setting maximum 
prices is as impermissible as setting minimum prices,21 and it does not matter that the decrease in 
price is “reasonable.”22  In 1940, the Supreme Court ruled that price-fixing—regardless of the 
supposed reasonableness of the price—is a per se violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.23  The 
Court explained that “[u]nder the Sherman Act a combination formed for the purpose and with the 
effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate 
or foreign commerce is illegal per se.”24  When the convicted group of major oil companies 
attempted to justify their efforts to stabilize the prices of gasoline in the Midwest, the Court refused 
to inquire into the reasonableness of their agreements.25  Instead, the Court concluded that all price-
fixing agreements must be “banned because of their actual or potential threat to the central nervous 
system of the economy.”26  
Almost forty years later, the Court revisited the issue of whether agreements among 
competitors to fix prices always falls within a category of activities deemed per se unlawful.27  In 
                                                     
18 The optimal price set by such competitors, assuming no other competitors, will depend on the costs of production 
and the elasticity of consumer demand.  See ANDREW I. GAVIL ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, 
CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 1821 (2d ed. 2008). 
19 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 13.  
20 See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id.  
24 Id. at 22324. 
25 Id. at 22021. 
26 Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. at 22425 n. 59. 
27 Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979). 
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Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., the Court ruled that, while 
horizontal price-fixing is inherently anticompetitive, “it is only after considerable experience with 
certain business relationships that courts [can] classify” certain arrangements as per se violations.28  
At issue was whether the use of blanket licenses by ASCAP and BMI to CBS of blanket licenses 
to copyrighted music was per se unlawful price fixing.  The Court found that the blanket licenses 
involved “price fixing” in the literal sense, but stated that: “We have never examined a practice 
like this one before. And though there has been rather intensive antitrust scrutiny of ASCAP and 
its blanket licenses, that experience hardly counsels that we should outlaw the blanket license as a 
per se restraint of trade.”29  Thus, “price fixing” is per se illegal but conduct that might literally be 
so described is not necessarily categorized as such.  In making the categorization decision, the 
Court uses analysis similar to the rule of reason to determine the appropriate analysis.30  While 
horizontal agreements to fix prices are almost always per se illegal, courts must have considerable 
experience with the relevant business relationships before categorizing the restraint as a per se 
violation of the Sherman Act.31  
Vertical price restraints, by contrast, exist between two entities on different levels of 
competition.32  When manufacturer A agrees with retailer X that X will not sell his product under 
$10, they have engaged in vertical price fixing.33  These types of agreements are called “resale 
price maintenance” agreements (“RPMs”).34  For over a century, vertical price fixing was per se 
illegal.35  However, in 2007, the Supreme Court acknowledged that RPMs can have both 
                                                     
28 Id. at 910. 
29 Id. 
30 See id.  
31 Id. 
32 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, 2425. 
33 Id. 
34 Leegin, 551 U.S. at 88687.  
35 Id. at 899 (overturning Dr. Miles). 
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anticompetitive and procompetitive effects on competition.36  For example, powerful retailers may 
abuse RPMs to encourage a manufacturer to boycott a rival retailer, which in effect may reduce 
output—an anticompetitive effect.37  Conversely, RPMs “can increase interbrand competition by 
facilitating market entry for new firms and brands”—a procompetitive effect.38  For this and other 
procompetitive reasons, vertical price restraints are now reviewed under the rule of reason.39  
The rule of reason is the dominant analysis in most antitrust claims because whether or not 
a questioned agreement imposes an unreasonable restraint on competition depends on a case-by-
case analysis balancing the anticompetitive and procompetitive effects.40  Under the rule of reason, 
courts look at information peculiar to the relevant business, as well as the restraint’s nature, 
purpose, and effect to determine its reasonableness.41  
Some courts have established a third standard of analysis known as the “quick look” rule.  
This type of review is an abbreviated version of the rule of reason when the anticompetitive effects 
are easily ascertained.42  Essentially it shifts the burden of proof from the plaintiff—to provide a 
                                                     
36 Id. at 892. 
37 See id.; see also id. at 89394 (“Resale price maintenance, furthermore, can be abused by a powerful manufacturer 
or retailer.  A dominant retailer, for example, might request resale price maintenance to forestall innovation in 
distribution that decreases cost.  A manufacturer might consider it has little choice but to accommodate the retailer’s 
demands for vertical price restraints if the manufacturer believes it needs access to the retailer’s distribution network.  
A manufacturer with market power, by comparison, might use resale price maintenance to give retailers an incentive 
not to sell the products if smaller rivals or new entrants.  As should be evident, the potential anticompetitive 
consequences of vertical price restraints must not be ignored or underestimated . . . . Notwithstanding the risks of 
unlawful conduct, it cannot be stated with any degree of confidence that resale price maintenance always or almost 
always tend to restrict competition and decrease output.”). (internal citations omitted).   
38See id. at 89194.(“Resale price maintenance, in addition, can increase interbrand competition by facilitating 
market entry for new firms and brands.   New manufacturers and manufacturers entering new markets can use the 
restrictions in order to induce competent and aggressive retailers to make the kind of investment of capital and labor 
that is often required in the distribution of products unknown to the consumer . . . . New products and new brands 
are essential to a dynamic economy, and if markets can be penetrated by using resale price maintenance there is a 
precompetitive effect.”) (internal citations omitted).    
 
40 See Cont’l T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 4950 (1977).  However, this is not true for some kinds of horizontal 
agreements, paradigmatically agreements to fix prices or to divide markets.   See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 886. 
41 Leegin, 551 U.S. at 885. 
42 United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 330 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 9 
full market analysis—to the defendant—to present the procompetitive justifications for its 
conduct.43  
C. The Steady Retreat of Per Se Liability 
 
In Leegin, the Supreme Court overturned the Dr. Miles44 precedent, and in doing so, 
explained how the per se rule under Section 1 has narrowed: “[R]espected authorities in the 
economics literature suggest the per se rule is inappropriate, and there is now widespread 
agreement that resale price maintenance can have procompetitive effects.”45  The Court relied on  
Congress’s failure to set Dr. Miles in stone evidenced the need for antitrust principles to “‘evolv[e] 
with new circumstances and new wisdom.’” 46   
The Court’s retreat from the per se rule for vertical conduct began in 1977, when the Court 
overturned the per se rule for vertical non-price restraints and adopted the rule of reason in its 
stead.47  In the 1980s, the Court further narrowed the scope of the per se rule when it held that 
vertical agreements to terminate a price-cutting competitor was to be analyzed under the rule of 
reason.48  In 1997, the Court overruled a twenty-nine year-old precedent treating vertical maximum 
price-fixing agreements as per se illegal.49  And finally in 2007, the Court abolished the per se 
treatment of vertical minimum price-fixing agreements—thus, requiring the application of the rule 
of reason to all vertical conduct.50  The Court stated:  
In sum, it is a flawed antitrust doctrine that serves the interests of lawyers—by creating 
legal distinctions that operate as traps for the unwary—more than the interests of 
                                                     
43 See id. 
44 Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911). 
45 Leegin, 551 U.S. at 900. 
46 Id. at 905 (citing Business Electronics, 485 U.S. at 732).  
47 See Cont’l T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (overruling United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 
U.S. 365 (1967)). 
48 Leegin, 551 U.S. at 901 (citing Business Electronics, 485 U.S. at 726727, 735736). 
49 State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 22 (1997). 
50 Leegin, 551 U.S. at 901. 
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consumers—by requiring manufacturers to choose second-best options to achieve 
sound business objectives.51  
 
Even with the steady retreat of the per se rule, determining how to analyze a restraint of 
trade is far from simple since arrangements usually involve a combination of various horizontal 
and vertical agreements.52  Group boycotts and “hub-and-spoke” arrangements are two categories 
that blur the lines between horizontal and vertical conduct. 
D. Group Boycotts 
 
Group boycotts occur when a prominent firm fosters an agreement with and among 
competing firms in order to cease dealing with, or boycott, a rival retailer or manufacturer.53  
Horizontal agreements between competitors to boycott a rival firm are said to be per se violations 
of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.54  Assuming the underlying concerted action has been found, a 
court must determine if that action unreasonably restricted competition.55  Since the Court has had 
significant experience with group boycotts, identifying certain types of reoccurring characteristics 
allows lower courts to find this practice a per se violation of the Sherman Act.56  
However, the antitrust treatment of such arrangements is not very straightforward.57  In 
Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery and Printing Co.,58 the Supreme Court 
noted that, even though group boycotts are often subject to per se invalidation, “exactly what types 
of activity fall within the forbidden category is . . . far from certain.”59  Northwest Wholesale 
                                                     
51 Id. at 903 (“For these reasons the Court’s decision in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 
373 (1911), is now overruled.  Vertical price restraints are to be judged according to the rule of reason.”). 
52 Antitrust Law Development, p. 2122.  
53 Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959). 
54 Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery and Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 294–95 (1985). 
55 See GAVIL ET AL., supra note 13, at 13844. 
56 See Antitrust Handbook § 2:19 p. 28788.  
57 See Northwest Wholesale Stationers, 472 U.S. 284.  
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 29394. 
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Stationers (“Northwest”) was a purchasing cooperative made up of a group of office supply 
retailers that decided to expel one of its members (“Pacific”).60  Pacific alleged that Northwest’s 
expulsion of them from the cooperative was a group boycott and thus, a per se violation of the 
Sherman Act.61  Although the Court found that Northwest’s conduct was a group boycott in 
restraint of trade, the Court ruled that, absent a showing that a group boycott possesses sufficient 
market power, courts should defer to a rule of reason analysis.62  
E. Hub-and-Spoke Conspiracies 
 
“Hub-and-spoke” conspiracies have been analyzed in a similar manner.  “A traditional hub-
and-spoke conspiracy has three elements: (1) a hub, such as a dominant purchaser; (2) spokes, 
such as competing manufacturers or distributors that enter into vertical agreements with the hub; 
and (3) the rim of the wheel, which consists of horizontal agreements among the spokes.”63  Cases 
involving “hub-and-spoke” arrangements either consist of the “hub” dominant retailer shepherding 
a group of horizontal competitors to boycott a rival of the retailer, or a group of horizontal 
competitors enlisting a “hub” supplier to enforce their collusive boycotting of one of their rivals.64  
“Hub-and-spoke” conspiracies are difficult to prove because most courts require proof of a 
“rim”—that is, a conspiracy among horizontal competitors—before holding the “hub” liable for 
its conduct.65  
                                                     
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Northwest Wholesaler Stationers, 472 U.S. 284.  The Court identified common questions for determining if the 
per se standard applies: (1) is the group action directed at fixing or restraining price competition; (2) is the claimed 
boycott horizontal or vertical in nature; (3) does it cut competitors off from access to a key resource; (4) do the 
boycotting parties have sufficient market power for their actions to be of competitive concern; and (5) have the 
defendants presented a plausible procompetitive justification for their conduct?  A reoccurring issue within the 
group boycott framework is whether proof of market power is necessary, and if so, how much?  See id.  
63 In re Musical Instruments & Equip. Antitrust Litig., 798 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2015). 
64 Brief for Petitioner at 2627, Apple, Inc. v. United States, No. 15-565 (U.S. Dec. 2, 2015).  
65 In re Musical Instruments, 798 F.3d at 1192 n.3. 
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The leading case on hub-and-spoke conspiracies is Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. F.T.C.,66 in which 
the dominant retailer (“Toys “R” Us) orchestrated a manufacturer boycott of discount warehouse 
clubs competing with it.67  While the boycotting manufacturers accounted for over forty percent 
of total industry sales, Toys “R” Us was a dominant entity at the affected retailer level.68  The court 
held that Toys “R” Us facilitated a per se illegal group boycott by using its dominant market power 
to cut off the boycotted firm’s access to the manufacturers without any plausible justification for 
enhancing competition.69  
While not all courts have recognized the existence of “hub-and-spoke” arrangements, most 
have recognized the general idea behind them.70  The “hub-and-spoke” inquiry was developed 
prior to Leegin71 when distinguishing vertical and horizontal price-fixing was irrelevant because 
both were deemed per se illegal.72  Essentially, as long as the restraint was meant to fix prices and 
the vertical actor was found to have facilitated the horizontal cartel, the “hub-and-spoke” 
conspiracy was per se illegal.  However, Leegin’s holding presents a new dilemma for analyzing 
“hub-and-spoke” arrangements.73  Significantly, in dicta, the Supreme Court stated that: 
A horizontal cartel among competing manufacturers or competing retailers that 
decreases output or reduces competition in order to increase price is, and ought to be, 
per se unlawful. To the extent a vertical agreement setting minimum resale prices is 
entered upon to facilitate either type of cartel, it, too, would need to be held unlawful 
under the rule of reason.74 
 
                                                     
66 221 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 2000). 
67 See id.  
68 Id. 
69 See Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. F.T.C., 221 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 2000).  
70 In re Musical Instruments, 798 F.3d at 1186. 
71 551 U.S. 877. 
72 See id. 
73 Apple, 791 F.3d at 346 (Jacobs, J., dissenting). 
74 Leegin, 551 U.S. at 893. 
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Since “hub-and-spoke” conspiracies include both vertical and horizontal actors, it is necessary 
to clarify whether the per se rule or the rule of reason analysis applies.  Put differently, should the 
vertical “hub’s” conduct be reviewed under the per se rule or the rule of reason?75  The remainder 
of this Comment will focus on answering this question by analyzing the e-book saga.76 
III. United States v. Apple 
A. E-Book Background 
In 2007, the page was turned on the book industry when Amazon released the Kindle, an 
electronic reading device that allows consumers to purchase, download, and read e-books.77  Prior 
to its development, the paper-book industry operated under a fairly stable business model.78  A 
publisher would sell the hardcover copies of a new release to a retailer at a “wholesale” price.79  
The publisher would then recommend a “list” price for resale to the consumer.80  In the United 
States, the six largest publishers “stood at the center of the multi-billion dollar book-producing 
industry.”81  Hachette, HarperCollins, Macmillan, Penguin, Random House, and Simon & 
Schuster are known as the “Big Six” in the publishing industry.82 In 2010, the “Bix Six” published 
                                                     
75 The answer I reach is that the rule of reason applies to the “hub” of such conspiracy.  I am mindful, however, of the 
quick look approach which would allow the burden to shift to the “hub” to state the procompetitive justifications if a 
horizontal cartel has already been proven.  As the Sixth Circuit stated, “[c]ourts cannot act perfunctorily when 
distinguishing restraints that merit a per se approach from those that deserve rule of reason analysis, and only if a 
restraint clearly and unquestionably falls within one of the handful of categories that have been collectively deemed 
per se anticompetitive can a court be justified in failing to apply an appropriate economic analysis to make this 
determination.”  Expert Masonry, Inc. v. Boone Cty, Ky., 440 F.3d 336, 34344 (6th Cir. 2006). 
76 “E-book saga” refers to United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2015). 
77 United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 296 (2d Cir. 2015). 
78 Id. at 298. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 See Apple, 791 F.3d at 298.  Only five of the six publishers accepted Apple’s terms and were a party to this 
lawsuit.  Id.  Those five will be referenced to as the “publisher defendants” throughout this Comment. 
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ninety-percent of the New York Times bestsellers in the United States.83  As the Second Circuit 
noted, under this business model, the publishers never really competed with one another on price.84    
Amazon dominated the e-book market until Apple’s launch of the iPad and the iBookstore 
on January 27, 2010.85  Before Apple’s entry into the e-book market, Amazon claimed almost 
ninety-percent of the e-book retail market and essentially faced no competition.86  Under a “loss 
leader” business plan, Amazon sold its new releases and best-seller e-books for $9.99—a lower 
price than the wholesale prices the publishers charged Amazon.87  This pricing strategy assured 
Amazon’s domination of the e-book market and attracted consumers to its other products.88  It also 
discouraged potential competitors from entering the market “because an entrant ‘would run the 
risk of losing money’” if it attempted to offer readers new innovative e-book platforms.89 
Amazon’s pricing not only hurt competition, but it also threatened the publishers who had 
no choice but to accept Amazon’s loss-leading retail model.90  The publishers believed the below-
cost e-book pricing was “predatory” because it “cannibalized” sales of hardcover print books.91  
However, the publishers, acting independently, were powerless against Amazon—which 
occasionally threatened publishers with retaliatory practices such as “remov[ing] the ‘buy buttons’ 
for print and e-book versions” of certain titles.92  The publishers had one potential option to 
withhold e-books from Amazon—“windowing.”93  But there were significant costs to windowing; 
                                                     
83 Id. 
84 See Geoffrey Manne, Why I Think the Apple E-books Antitrust Decision Will (or At Least Should) Be Overturned, 
TRUTHONTHEMARKET (July 22, 2013) (“The price of Stephen King’s latest novel likely has, at best, a trivial effect 
on sales of… nearly every other fiction book published, and probably zero effect on sales of non-fiction books.”). 
85 Apple, 791 F.3d at 308. 
86 Id. at 342 (Jacobs, J., dissenting). 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id.  
90 Apple, 791 F.3d at 342.  
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 343 (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (referring to Macmillan). 
93See United States v. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638, 65152 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“By making the more expensive 
hardcover version available to the public before the lower priced e-book, the publisher defendants hoped to protect 
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“it made books unavailable to consumers in digital form, alienated e-book readers, encouraged 
piracy, and harmed long-term book sales.”94  The publishers were motivated to regain some pricing 
power and find a new entrant to challenge Amazon’s monopoly.  Enter Apple—“marketplace 
vigilante.”95  
In December 2009, after developing the iBookstore for the iPad’s launch, Apple opened 
negotiations with each of the Bix Six.96  Concerned with competing effectively with Amazon, 
Apple focused on finding a way to enter the e-book market on profitable terms.97  Apple 
understood two things: (1) the publishers were unhappy with what they viewed as Amazon’s 
predatory pricing; and (2) to break Amazon’s barrier to entry, Apple needed to attract “a critical 
mass of publishers so that it could provide a broad, compelling–book selection to consumers.”98  
With the iPad launch only weeks away, Apple devised a vertical distribution contract with 
three core components: an agency system, a “most-favored-nation” (“MFN”) clause, and a 
maximum price cap.99  The agency model, in contrast to Amazon’s wholesale model, allowed the 
publishers to “set the retail prices of e-books sold through Apple’s platform,” while allowing Apple 
to take a fixed commission on each sale.100  But the agency model exposed Apple to a big risk—it 
allowed for the publishers to potentially set prices un-competitively high.101  As a solution, Apple 
used MFN clauses to ensure that each publisher did not set prices higher than those offered by any 
other e-book retailer.102  Additionally, Apple used price caps to ensure “that a publisher would not 
                                                     
the sales of New Release hardcover books and to pressure Amazon to raise its e-book prices.”). 
94 Brief for Petitioner at 5, Apple, Inc. v. United States, No. 15-565 (U.S. Dec. 2, 2015); see also Apple, 952 F. 
Supp. 2d at 653. 
95 Apple, 791 F.3d at 298. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 343 (Jacobs, J., dissenting). 
98 Brief for Petitioner at 7, Apple, Inc. v. United States, No. 15-565 (U.S. Dec. 2, 2015). 
99 Apple, 791 F.3d at 343 (Jacobs, J., dissenting). 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
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set its iBookstore prices so high to damage . . . [its] credibility with consumers.”103  These 
interrelated provisions made it possible for Apple to enter the e-books market as a viable 
competitor against Amazon.104  
After intense negotiations with each of the Big Six, five publishers signed Apple’s agency 
contract.105  “Apple unveiled its e-book retail platform—the iBookstore—at the first public 
demonstration of the iPad on January 27, 2010.”106  The publishers then acted in concert to 
negotiate new terms with Amazon.107  The MFN clauses in Apple’s contracts with the publishers 
essentially forced the publishers to convince Amazon to adopt an agency model.108  If Amazon 
had continued to sell e-books at below-cost prices, “the MFN clause would [have] allowed Apple 
to match Amazon’s price for bestsellers, and pay the publishers no more than a percentage 
commission on $9.99.”109  The publishers, encouraged by an Apple executive, acted as a “united 
front”110 and by June 2010, each publisher had convinced Amazon to adopt an agency model.111  
Apple’s entry was disruptive to say the least.112  Within two years, Amazon’s share of the e-book 
                                                     
103 Brief for Petitioner at 8, Apple, Inc. v. United States, No. 15-565 (U.S. Dec. 2, 2015). 
104 See id.  Compare to the majority opinion in Apple: “Thus, the terms of the negotiation between Apple and the 
publishers became clear: Apple wanted quick and successful entry into the e-book market and to eliminate retail price 
competition with Amazon.  In exchange, it offered the publishers an opportunity ‘to confront Amazon as one of an 
organized group . . . united in an effort to eradicate the $9.99 price point.’  Both sides needed a critical mass of 
publishers to achieve their goals.  The MFN played a pivotal role in this quid pro quo by ‘stiffen[ing] the spines of the 
[publishers] to ensure that they would demand new terms from Amazon,’ and protecting Apple from retail price 
competition.”  Apple, 791 F.3d at 305.  However, the majority erred in two ways: (1) by demonizing Apple’s 
independent business interest in wanting a “quick and successful entry into the e-book market;” and (2) by suggesting 
that there was any retail price competition to begin with.  Significantly, long-term prices have fallen as a whole since 
Apple’s market entry.  See id.  
105 Id. at 343 (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (noting that “[o]nly Random House, the country’s largest publisher, did not” 
sign; the five signatures represented over forty-eight percent of all e-books in the United States).  
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 Apple, 791 at 34344 (Jacobs, J., dissenting). 
110 Id. at 344. 
111 Brief for Petitioner at 10, Apple, Inc. v. United States, No. 15-565 (U.S. Dec. 2, 2015). 
112 Apple, 791 F.3d at 342 (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (characterizing as “a substantial monopoly” a market share of 
“over 80% of the field”).  Prior to Apple’s disruptive entry, “Amazon’s ninety-percent market share constituted a 
monopoly under antitrust law.”  Id. 
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retail market dropped from ninety-percent to sixty percent, total e-book output increased, and 
overall e-book prices fell.113 
B. The Second Circuit’s Discussion 
 
Judge Debra Anne Livingston wrote the majority opinion for the Second Circuit in Apple114 
and held that Apple’s facilitation of the publisher defendants’ horizontal conspiracy was a per se 
violation of the Sherman Act.115  Alternatively, Judge Livingston affirmed the district court’s 
opinion under the rule of reason.116  Judge Raymond Lohier joined Judge Livingston in the 
majority opinion (“the majority”), but wrote a separate concurring opinion explaining why he felt 
the per se standard applied and no further rule of reason inquiry was necessary.117  Judge Jacobs 
dissented, finding that Apple had not violated the Sherman Act because Apple’s procompetitive 
justifications outweighed its anticompetitive conduct when the appropriate rule of reason analysis 
was applied to Apple’s conduct as a vertical facilitator of a horizontal conspiracy.118  However, 
the Second Circuit panel did not reach a majority  on the rule of reason analysis.119  Rather, the 
majority affirmed the district court’s ruling and held that Apple conspired with the publisher 
defendants to eliminate retail price competition and to raise e-book prices in violation of Section 
1 of the Sherman Act.120  
The majority began its analysis by concluding that there was enough direct and 
circumstantial evidence to conclude that the provisions in Apple’s contracts with the publishers, 
                                                     
113 Id. at 328 (noting that prices across the e-book market as a whole fell slightly and total output increased). 
114 Apple, 791 F.3d 290. 
115 See id. (“In light of our conclusion that the district court did not err in determining that Apple organized a price-
fixing conspiracy among the publisher defendants, Apple and the dissent’s initial argument against the per se rule—
that Apple’s conduct must be subject to rule-of-reason analysis because it involved merely multiple independent, 
vertical agreements with the publisher defendants—cannot succeed”).  
116 Id. at 329.  
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 342 (Jacobs, J., dissenting). 
119 Id. at 349 (Jacobs, J. dissenting). 
120 Apple, 791 F.3d at 325. 
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although each independently lawful, showed that Apple “consciously orchestrated a conspiracy 
among the publisher defendants.”121  After finding that Apple’s vertical conduct facilitated the 
publisher defendant’s horizontal price-fixing conspiracy, the majority concluded that “the relevant 
agreement in restraint of trade” was the horizontal price-fixing conspiracy, “not Apple’s vertical 
contracts with the publisher defendants.”122   
Judge Livingston primarily relied on two Supreme Court cases, Klor’s Inc. v. Broadway-
Hale Stores, Inc.123 and United States v. General Motors Corp.,124 to show that all participants in 
a “hub-and-spoke” conspiracy are liable “when the objective of the conspiracy [is] a per se 
unreasonable restraint of trade.”125  The majority concluded that the wording in Leegin126 did not 
change the law governing “hub-and-spoke” conspiracies because the passage was “entirely 
consistent with holding the ‘hub’ liable for the horizontal agreement that it joins.”127  The majority 
reasoned that, in  “hub-and-spoke” arrangements, “the vertical organizer has not only committed 
to vertical agreements, but has also agreed to participate in the horizontal conspiracy.”128  In sum, 
the court held that Apple, as the vertical organizer of a horizontal conspiracy, agreed to a price-
fixing restraint that was not “any less anticompetitive than its co-conspirators, and [therefore could 
not] escape per se liability.”129  In the alternative, Apple argued that it ought to be allowed to 
introduce its procompetitive justifications for facilitating the horizontal conspiracy because the 
arrangement promoted “enterprise and productivity.”130  However, the majority did not believe 
                                                     
121 Id. at 317. 
122 Id. at 323. 
123 Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959). 
124 United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966). 
125 Apple, 791 F.3d at 322. 
126 551 U.S. 887. 
127 Apple, 791 U.S. at 324. 
128 Id. at 325. 
129 Id. 
130 See Broadcast Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 1. 
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that Apple’s emergence into the e-book industry fit within the narrow line of decisions supporting 
its argument.131   
Judge Livingston, writing for herself, continued to analyze the competitive effect of 
Apple’s horizontal agreement with the publisher defendants under the rule of reason.132  She stated: 
“I am mindful of Apple’s argument that the nascent e-book industry has some new and unusual 
features and that the per se rule is not fit for ‘business relationships where the economic impact of 
certain practices is not immediately obvious.’”133  However, Judge Livingston applied an 
abbreviated version of the rule of reason—known as a “quick look” rule.134  She felt the “quick 
look” analysis was appropriate given that the anticompetitive effects of Apple’s conduct were 
easily ascertained.135  Thus, the burden of proof shifted directly to Apple’s procompetitive 
justifications for organizing the conspiracy.136  
First, Judge Livingston dismissed Apple’s argument that “by eliminating Amazon’s $9.99 
price point, the agreement enabled Apple and other e-book retailers to enter the market and 
challenge Amazon’s dominance.”137  She reasoned that Apple’s deconcentration of the e-book 
industry was no justification for eliminating retail price competition.138  Further, she concluded 
that “Apple and the dissent err[ed] first in equating a symptom (a single-retailer market) with a 
disease (a lack of competition), and then err[ed] again by prescribing the disease itself as the 
cure.”139  
                                                     
131 See id; see also Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (U.S. 1984). 
132 Apple, 791 U.S. at 329. 
133 Id. at 329 (citing Leegin, 551 U.S. 877). 
134 Id. at 330. 
135 See id.  The quick look rule might be appropriate, but the use of it here tainted the rule of reason analysis and was 
written merely in response to the dissent.  
136 Id. 
137 Apple, 791 F.3d at 330. 
138 Id. at 331. 
139 Id. at 332. 
 20 
Second, Judge Livingston dismissed Apple’s argument that the eventual industry-wide 
decline of e-book prices was a procompetitive benefit because “Apple failed to establish a 
connection between the benefits and the conspiracy among Apple and the publisher defendants.”140  
In addition, she dismissed Apple’s argument that the technological innovations embedded in the 
iPad were procompetitive benefits to consumer since the iPad was unrelated to Apple’s agreement 
with the publisher defendants.141  In sum, Judge Livingston found that Apple failed to present any 
viable procompetitive justifications for facilitating a horizontal price-fixing conspiracy and the 
abbreviated rule of reason analysis was simply offered in response to the dissenting opinion.142  
In contrast, Judge Jacob, in his dissenting opinion, concluded that Apple’s procompetitive 
justifications outweighed its anticompetitive conduct when the appropriate rule of reason analysis 
was applied to Apple’s role as a vertical facilitator of a horizontal conspiracy.143  Judge Jacobs 
focused on three points to illustrate the majority’s and the district court’s errors: (1) that a “vertical 
agreement designed to facilitate a horizontal cartel ‘would need to be held unlawful under the rule 
of reason’”; (2) that “the district court’s alternative ruling under the rule of reason was 
predetermined by its (erroneous) per se ruling”; and (3) that “Apple’s conduct, assessed under the 
rule of reason on the horizontal plane of retail competition, was unambiguously and 
overwhelmingly pro-competitive.”144 
Judge Jacobs began with the reminder that per se liability is the exception and “is reserved 
for those categories of behavior so definitely and universally anticompetitive that a court’s 
consideration of market force and reasonableness would be pointless.”145  He then relied on the 
                                                     
140 Id. at 334. 
141 Id. at 335. 
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143 Apple, 791 F.3d at 348 (Jacobs, J., dissenting). 
144 Id. at 341. 
145 Id. at 345. 
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Supreme Court’s steady retreat from the per se rule and its explicit signal from Leegin146 to 
conclude that the vertical participant in a “hub-and-spoke” conspiracy can no longer be held a per 
se violation of the Sherman Act.147  
In his reasoning, Judge Jacobs focused on the competitive differences between horizontal 
collusion and the influence of a vertical arrangement on a horizontal cartel.148  He pointed out that 
“[c]ollusion among competitors does not describe Apple’s conduct or account for its motive.”149  
Rather, Apple’s competition with Amazon (the dominant retailer) took place on a “horizontal plane 
distinct from the plane of the horizontal conspiracy among the publishers.”150  Significantly, Judge 
Jacobs stated “[a]ll Apple’s energy—all it did that has been condemned in this case—was directed 
to weakening its competitive rival, and pushing it aside to make room for Apple’s entry.”151 
Additionally, Judge Jacobs concluded that the per se rule was inapplicable because several 
features made the restraint one that no court had previously considered: “(a) a vertical relationship 
(b) facilitating a horizontal conspiracy (c) to overcome barriers to entry in a market dominated by 
a single firm (d) in an industry created by an emergent technology.”152  
Under a full rule of reason analysis, Judge Jacobs reached the conclusion that Apple’s 
conduct yielded “such substantial procompetitive results that per se liability [was] an abdication 
of the duty to distinguish reasonable restraints from those that are unreasonable.”153  First, Judge 
Jacobs accounted for the anticompetitive effects of Apple’s conduct: shifting the pricing power 
                                                     
146 551 U.S. 877. 
147 Apple, 791 U.S. at 346 (Jacobs, J., dissenting). 
148 Id. 
149 Id. at 347. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. at 34748 (Jacobs, J., dissenting). 
152 Id. at 348. 
153 Apple, 791 F.3d at 348 (Jacobs, J., dissenting). 
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from e-book retailers to e-book publishers154 and “end[ing] Amazon’s $9.99 price for most new 
releases and bestsellers.”155  Next, he turned to the procompetitive effects: deconcentrating the e-
book retail market, removing barriers to entry by others, and encouraging innovation.156  Further, 
the dissent argued that the absence of an appropriate alternative theory for Apple’s market entry 
“bespeaks the reasonableness of the measures Apple took.”157  Judge Jacobs concluded with the 
following statement:  
Apple took steps to compete with a monopolist and open the market to more entrants, 
generating only minor competitive restraints in the process. Its conduct was eminently 
reasonable; no one has suggested a viable alternative. ‘What could be more perverse 
than an antitrust doctrine that discouraged new entry into high concentrated 
markets?’158  
 
IV. Analysis 
 
A. Introduction 
 
Determining whether to apply the per se rule or the rule of reason to a restraint of trade is 
far from simple, and courts have struggled with the problem since the inception of the Sherman 
Act.  At the outset, it is imperative to understand that the essential inquiry of both standards 
remains the same:  “Whether or not the challenged restraint enhances competition.”159  No bright 
                                                     
154 See id. at 350 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).  However, he quickly identified that the shift of pricing power “operated as 
a restraint only in the sense that Amazon faced pressure to adopt an agency model and to charge prices set by the five 
publishers, which of course remained in competition with each other, and with the publishers who account for the 
remaining [fifty-two] percent of the industry.”  Id. 
155 Id.  “But the consumer’s near-term preference for low prices is not an object of antitrust law.  The district court 
charts the short-term price developments, treating the end of below-cost pricing as anticompetitive and observing with 
disapproval the natural tendency for prices to rise to competitive levels. The rule of reason promotes competition; it 
can be safely assumed that if competition sharpens, prices will take care of themselves.”  Id. 
156 See id. at 35051 (noting that a “removal of a barrier to entry reduces for the long term a market’s vulnerability to 
monopolization).  These effects sound in the basic goals of antitrust law.  Even if only quick-look analysis were 
appropriate in this case, these effects would vindicate Apple’s conduct.”  Id. 
157 See id. (offering potential alternative theories that he then concludes were never really options for Apple). 
158 Apple, 791 F.3d at 352 (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (quoting In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 782 F.3d 867, 874 
(7th Cir. 2015)). 
159 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 8586 (1984). 
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line separates the per se rule from rule of reason analysis.160  Horizontal agreements among 
competitors to fix prices or divide markets are the only restraints explicitly recognized by the 
Supreme Court as per se unlawful.161  When competitors collude to fix prices in a market, their 
motives become aligned, dominant, and create irresistible temptations162 that threaten the “central 
nervous system of the economy.”163  Resort to the per se rule is justified for such restraints because 
judicial experience enables courts to predict that their anticompetitive effects outweigh any 
procompetitive justifications under the rule of reason in all or almost all instances.164   
This creates a two-step inquiry to determine whether a restraint falls within a per se category. 
First, is the arrangement between competitors, and does it fix prices or reduce output in the relevant 
market?165  Second, is the arrangement one that courts have previously determined always or 
almost always restricts competition without the ability to increase economic efficiencies and 
render markets more competitive?166  
This Section will argue that the Supreme Court should reverse the Second Circuit majority’s 
holding in United States v. Apple167 for two reasons:  (1) the per se rule is inappropriate for courts 
to apply to a novel restraint used to enter an emergent market; and (2) vertical conduct always 
needs to be analyzed under the rule of reason—even when it facilitates a horizontal cartel. 
B. The Per Se Rule Does Not Apply To Novel Restraints With Non-Obvious Economic 
Effects 
 
The Second Circuit’s use of the per se rule was inappropriate because both Apple’s unique 
                                                     
160 Id. at 86 n. 26. 
161 Leegin, 551 U.S. at 886. 
162 Apple, 791 U.S. at 347 (Jacobs, J., dissenting). 
163 Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. at 22425 n. 59. 
164 Leegin, 551 U.S. at 88687. 
165 See id. 
166 See Broadcast Music, Inc., 441 U.S. 1.  
167 791 F.3d 290. 
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combination of vertical agreements and the “nascent”168 e-book industry presented the court with 
a novel restraint for which the per se rule is unfit.169  The Supreme Court has encouraged courts to 
refrain from applying the per se rule when the lack of exposure to similar restraints makes the 
economic impact not immediately obvious.170  Significantly, the government in Apple171 conceded 
that Apple’s use of a combination of vertical arrangements created a restraint “no court ha[d] 
previously considered.”172  Moreover, Judge Livingston herself stated that a rule of reason analysis 
may have been appropriate because the economic impact was not immediately obvious.173  In his 
dissent, Judge Jacobs correctly pointed out the features that make Apple’s arrangement novel:  “(a) 
a vertical relationship (b) facilitating a horizontal conspiracy (c) to overcome barriers to entry in a 
market dominated by a single firm (d) in an industry created by an emergent technology.”174  
In Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc.,175 the Supreme Court rejected the 
lower court’s use of the per se rule for conduct it labeled “price-fixing” because the Court “ha[d] 
never examined a practice like [it] before.”176  Similarly, in Sulfuric Acid,177 the Seventh Circuit 
distinguished the alleged price-fixing restraint from those deserving per se treatment because the 
arrangement involved a new market entrant in novel circumstances.178  The court cautioned that 
                                                     
168 Id. at 329. 
169 Id. 
170 Leegin, 551 U.S. at 88687 (“It should come as no surprise, then, that we have expressed reluctance to adopt per 
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and effect of the price-fixing agreement in Socony-Vacuum were to raise price; in this case the aim was to facilitate 
entry into the U.S. market, which would (and eventually did, as we’ll see) lower prices and prevent the shutdown of 
Canadian smelting operations, which would have reduced output and raised the price of sulfuric acid in the United 
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“[i]t is a bad idea to subject a novel way of doing business (or an old way in a new and previously 
unexamined context [ ]) to per se treatment under antitrust law.”179 
Here, the Second Circuit majority’s use of the per se rule was erroneous given that Apple’s 
complex contracting arrangements were used to enter a novel market dominated by a monopolist 
firm.180  Apple’s use of an agency model in the e-book industry (and really, the whole book 
industry in general) was an innovative practice, which no court had ever considered in the relevant 
market.181  Further, no court could have had previous exposure to a firm attempting to enter into 
the “nascent” e-book market because Amazon developed a loss-lending practice that erected 
barriers to entry in order for it to capture ninety-percent of the market.182  If the goals of antitrust 
laws are to foster competition and prohibit unreasonable restraints of trade, then by no means 
should Apple’s use of a unique business model to enter the e-book market be analyzed under a 
rule “designed for cases in which experience has convinced the judiciary that [the] particular type 
of business practice has no redeeming benefits ever.”183  
Apple entered the e-book market through a series of vertical contracts with the publishers, 
landing them on a completely distinct horizontal plane of retail competition.184  Its entry as a 
formidable competitor to Amazon increased competition, “i.e., greater interbrand competition, 
that [brought] with it net consumer benefits.”185  As the district court noted, Apple’s entry into the 
                                                     
States.  The overall effect was thus to lower rather than to raise price.  The plaintiffs' claim that the price would have 
been even lower without the shutdown agreements is doubtful, as we have said, because without the agreements the 
Canadian companies might not have entered the U.S. market.”); see also Sylvania at 5354 n.22 (noting the 
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179 See id. (citing Leegin, 551 U.S. at 88687). 
180 Apple, 791 U.S. at 290. 
181 See id. 
182 I am not arguing that Amazon had an unlawful monopoly. It was merely benefiting from its innovation, however, 
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183 In re Sulfuric Acid Antitrust Litig., 703 F.3d at 1012.  
184 Apple, 791 U.S. at 341 (Jacobs, J., dissenting). 
185 Leegin, 551 U.S. at 913 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
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market was “extremely beneficial to consumers and competition.”186  Within two years, Amazon’s 
share of the e-book retail market dropped from ninety-percent to sixty percent, total e-book output 
increased, and overall e-book prices fell.187 
The growth of e-commerce and the technological innovations that come with it have 
drastically changed how consumers function in our economy.188  Apple’s iBookstore is a perfect 
example of how digital platforms have changed the economy: it was introduced (and still 
functions) as a digital platform for consumers to purchase and read e-books on the iPad (a 
revolutionary device itself).189  Consumers depend on content platforms, such as the iBookstore, 
to “aggregat[e] content from diverse suppliers into convenient, feature-rich forums that are easy 
for consumers to use.”190  However, firms that create innovative digital platforms must be able to 
assemble content suppliers in an efficient manner.191  New platform entrants, such as Apple, often 
offer a combination of vertical restraints to multiple content suppliers (such as the publishers) to 
achieve these objectives.192  Common examples include:  fixed-price supply contracts; exclusivity 
contracts; “price ceilings to ensure sufficient demand; and . . . MFNs to attract sellers and mitigate 
the ability of competitors to undermine their entry.”193  Even where these vertical restraints 
facilitate collusion on a different plane of competition, they also may genuinely “enhance overall 
efficiency and make markets more competitive.”194 
                                                     
186 The “creativity and commitment of Apple invested in the enhancement of a product like the iBookstore is 
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This is exactly why distinguishing between vertical and horizontal conduct is crucial before 
a court finds a violation of the Sherman Act.  By holding Apple per se liable for facilitating and 
participating in the publishers’ horizontal conspiracy, the Second Circuit majority was able to 
downplay and even overlook Apple’s procompetitive justifications that completely differed from 
that of the publishers.195  Moreover, the majority avoided dealing with the unusual features of 
Apple’s arrangement by drawing a formalistic line rather than addressing the demonstrable 
economic effects of increased retailer competition and innovation in an emergent technological 
market.196  An expansive per se rule can chill the modern economy by discouraging reasonable 
risks that foster competition.197  In accordance with the Supreme Court’s repeated caution against 
the per se rule, the Second Circuit should have refrained from holding Apple per se liable given 
the highly novel circumstances of its entry into the e-book market.  
C. The Rule of Reason Applies to Vertical Facilitators of Horizontal Cartels  
 
Vertical conduct that facilitates a horizontal conspiracy cannot be condemned as per se illegal.  
The Supreme Court’s overruling of Dr. Miles was the final straw in rejecting per se treatment for 
any vertical conduct.198  Leegin explicitly stated that “[t]o the extent a vertical agreement setting 
minimum resale prices is entered upon to facilitate either type of [horizontal] cartel, it, too, would 
need to be held unlawful under the rule of reason.”199  However, the Second Circuit dismissed this 
statement as a non-binding “cryptic sentence” that did not affect “the law governing hub-and-
spoke conspiracies.”200  Ignoring Leegin’s direct signal enabled the majority to overlook the 
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procompetitive effects of Apple’s vertical dealings with the publisher defendants and hold Apple 
per se liable as the “hub” of a horizontal price-fixing conspiracy. 
In Apple, the only agreement deemed unlawful was the publisher defendants’ agreement to 
fix e-book prices.201  Restraints imposed by agreements between competitors are horizontal and 
illegal per se. 202  The Supreme Court has made it clear that “a restraint is horizontal not because 
it has horizontal effects, but because it is the product of a horizontal agreement.”203  Horizontal 
restraints are presumed anticompetitive because when competitors agree to fix prices or reduce 
output they are inherently posing a threat to competition within their market.204  In Apple, the 
publishers competed on the same horizontal plane in the e-book market and agreed to raise 
prices.205  Thus, the publisher defendants’ concerted action warranted per se liability. 
However, the Second Circuit inappropriately relied on pre-Leegin cases to conclude that 
the “hub” should not be any less liable than the “spokes” in a price-fixing conspiracy.206  “Hub-
and-spoke” cases all rely on the central idea that the conspiracy’s exclusive purpose is to either 
illegally boycott or undermine a rival firm.207  For example, in Toys “R” Us,208 the Seventh Circuit 
held Toys “R” Us liable for facilitating a group boycott.209  The court found that Toys “R” Us used 
its dominant market power to cut off the boycotted firm’s access to the manufacturers without any 
plausible justification for enhancing competition.210  However, in its analysis, the court still paused 
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to consider whether Toys “R” Us’s conduct was in pursuit of avoiding free riding—a 
procompetitive objective—and found that it was not.211  
Similarly, in Klor’s Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.,212 a dominant retailer (Broadway-
Hale) organized a group boycott against a small competing retailer (Klor’s).213  The Court found 
that the agreement between Broadway-Hale and a combination of manufacturers and distributors 
destroyed interbrand competition by driving out retailers trying to compete in an open market.214  
Thus, Broadway-Hale was held per se liable for abusing its market power to organize a naked 
boycott against its competitors.215  
In addition, the Second Circuit in Apple relied on United States v. General Motors Corp.,216 
in which a horizontal cartel (Chevrolet retailers) enlisted a “hub” (General Motors) to enforce its 
boycotting of rival competitors (discount retailer).217  In General Motors, the Court found that the 
Chevrolet dealers had procured GM as a “hub” to terminate business dealings with discount 
retailers that strayed from the dealers’ horizontal agreement.218  The Court ruled that “a facially 
vertical restraint imposed by a manufacturer only because it has been coerced by a ‘horizontal 
cartel’ agreement among his distributors is in reality a horizontal restraint.”219  Thus, GM was held 
per se liable for using “facially vertical” conduct to enforce the horizontal agreements that 
originated between competitors.220 
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Apple, by contrast, assembled suppliers for its new e-book platform in pursuit of entering 
a market dominated by a single retailer.  Unlike Toys “R” Us and Broadway-Hale, Apple did not 
already dominate the relevant market, and its entry increased competition in the relevant retailer 
market.221  Additionally, unlike GM, Apple’s dealings were not “facially vertical” because Apple 
was not coerced by a horizontal cartel to enforce their naked restraint.222  Rather, Apple’s conduct 
was in pursuit of a non-pretextual procompetitive objective—market entry.223  Apple advanced its 
own business interests by entering into vertical agreements with the publishers to bring its new 
content platform to an emerging market.  Significantly, Apple’s entrance into the e-book market 
benefitted consumers by increasing competition between e-book retailers and raising output.224  
Essentially, Apple’s conduct was not merely a facially vertical restraint that harmed competition 
between the publishers.  Accordingly, Apple’s conduct does not fit in line with the pre-Leegin 
“hub-and-spoke” cases because its vertical role in the arrangement had inherent procompetitive 
effects on a new industry.  
Few courts have analyzed “hub-and-spoke” conspiracies since Leegin.225  Most recently, 
in In re Musical Instruments & Equipment,226 the Ninth Circuit reconfirmed the importance of “not 
introducing needless confusion into antitrust terminology.”227  Even though the Ninth Circuit had 
never recognized the existence of “hub-and-spoke” conspiracies, it wrote “to clarify the analysis 
of such conspiracies under [Section] 1.”  First, the court acknowledged that sometimes “the line 
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between horizontal and vertical restraints can blur.”228  Nevertheless, the court concluded that a 
“hub-and-spoke” conspiracy is “simply a collection of vertical and horizontal agreements . . . , 
[a]nd once the conspiracy is broken into its constituent parts, the respective vertical and horizontal 
agreements can be analyzed either under the rule of reason or as violations per se.”229 
Similarly, in Toledo Mack,230 the Third Circuit—following Leegin’s instruction—held that 
the rule of reason standard applies even when the “purpose of [a] vertical agreement between a 
manufacturer and its dealers is to support illegal horizontal agreements between multiple 
dealers.”231  Toledo Mack Sales and Service, Inc. (“Toledo”), a former authorized Mack Trucks, 
Inc. (“Mack” or “Mack Trucks”) dealer, alleged that a group of Mack dealers had agreed not to 
compete on prices, and further, that Mack Trucks vertically enforced that agreement by penalizing 
dealers that did not conform to the arrangement.232  First, the Third Circuit found that Toledo 
presented enough direct evidence to conclude that a horizontal conspiracy not to compete existed 
among the Mack dealers.233  The court then concluded that Mack itself entered into an 
anticompetitive agreement with its dealers.234  The only question left for the court to decide was 
whether the agreement was an unreasonable restraint of trade.  Relying on Leegin, the court 
determined that “[i]n contrast to horizontal price-fixing agreements between entities at the same 
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level of a product’s chain, the legality of a vertical agreement that imposes a restriction on the 
dealer’s ability to sell the manufacturer’s product is governed by the rule of reason.”235 
As Judge Jacobs and others have recognized, the majority’s holding in Apple created a 
circuit split “and put [the Second Circuit] on the wrong side of it.”236  Both In re Musical 
Equipment and Toledo Mack support the proposition that Leegin changed how such “hub-and-
spoke” conspiracies are to be analyzed.237  Whether the per se rule applies to a new market entrant 
whose vertical conduct facilitates a horizontal price-fixing conspiracy is a question that could 
drastically affect this nation’s economy.238  The rule of reason embodies the true test of legality 
under the Sherman Act because it balances the competitive effects of a restraint to determine 
whether the challenged agreement is one that ultimately promotes or suppresses competition.239  
Thus, it is imperative that the more flexible rule of reason be applied when determining the liability 
of a vertical facilitator of a horizontal cartel.    
V. Conclusion 
 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act protects competition by “‘outlaw[ing] only unreasonable 
restraints’” of trade.240  Over the past century, the Supreme Court has encouraged the use of the 
rule of reason analysis to “distinguish[] between restraints with anticompetitive effects that are 
harmful to the consumer and restraints stimulating competition that are in the consumer’s best 
interest.”241  Accordingly, the Supreme Court has restricted its use of per se illegality to a narrow 
set of “horizontal agreements among competitors to fix prices . . . or to divide markets.”242  Since 
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the Supreme Court’s decision in Leegin, it has become necessary for courts to distinguish between 
vertical and horizontal conduct when determining whether the rule of reason or the per se rule 
should be the governing standard.  However, the circuit courts’ interpretations of Leegin are 
inconsistent and have created great uncertainty concerning the “demarcation between lawful 
vertical conduct and per se illegal facilitations of a horizontal conspiracy.”243  Consequently, 
companies—particularly new market entrants—may be counseled by attorneys to refrain from 
certain vertical contracting to circumvent the possibility of facing per se liability.244  The Second 
Circuit’s expansion of the per se rule will certainly chill the economy by discouraging reasonable 
risks that foster competition.  For “[w]hat could be more perverse than an antitrust doctrine that 
discouraged new entry into highly concentrated markets?”245 
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